Disclosure has several properties that make it suitable for deterring activist intervention: (1) it reduces information asymmetries between shareholders, including management and the board; (2) it signals managerial credibility to the board and existing shareholders; (3) it erodes activists private information advantage; (4) it corrects mispricings; and (5) it increases stock liquidity. Shareholder Activism And Voluntary Disclosure. Hong Kong University of Science Technology (HKUST) Jordan Schoenfeld. Abstract: This paper studies the relation between voluntary disclosure and shareholder activism. Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure Thomas Bourveau HKUST actb@ust. hk Jordan Schoenfeld University of Utah October 2015 We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the. We examine the impact of hedge fund interventions on target firms strategic behavior, specifically their voluntary disclosure and earnings management strategies. With as many as 750 public companies publicly subjected to investor demands each year, shareholder activism remains at the forefront of the corporate finance conversation. governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate The MSWG was established in 2001 with the purpose of enhancing shareholder activism and protecting. We evaluate disclosure practices of SP 500 firms by (1) examining factors that motivate activist investors to demand disclosure, (2) determinants of managers disclosure choices, and (3) investor reactions to the initiation of disclosure. We find that activist investors, particularly pension funds, do not target firms with entrenched managers, for which investors are most likely to benefit from disclosure. 1 The opposing view is that disclosure could promote activism by advantaging activists, who might be superior processors of company disclosures (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). The above bene ts to disclosure might also get o set by any stock liquidity e ects of disclosure, which might promote activism (Edmans et al. 1 Towards a Theory of Positive Governance: The Effects of Nonfinancial Voluntary Disclosure, Shareholder Activism, and Research on structure may disclose more information to shareholders through voluntary disclosure To measure the level of disclosure of Given shareholder activism and. Posted by Jordan Schoenfeld, University of Utah, on Wednesday, October 21, 2015 Editor's Note: Jordan Schoenfeld is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the. On the Causal Effects of Voluntary Disclosure. their cost of capital via voluntary disclosure. Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. Electronic copy available at: : ssrn. com abstract Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure Abstract We examine the relation between. Yi Yang Purpose PhD insights regarding how to initiate shareholder activism on CSR disclosure based on voluntary disclosure theories and social. We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. By Thomas Bourveau and Jordan Schoenfeld; Abstract: Abstract We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of On Jun 8, 2017 Thomas Bourveau (and others) published: Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure Using corporate political spending disclosures as our empirical setting, we conduct a detailed inquiry of shareholder proposals to highlight the role of shareho Study of shareholder activism focuses on disclosure of corporate political spending. discuss her project Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure. When Does Institutional Investor Activism Increase Shareholder Value? : The Carbon Disclosure Project Abstract This paper presents the first empirical test of the. The School of Accountancy at Singapore Management University (SMU) is pleased to announce the SOAR Accounting Symposium to be held on Thursday 10 and Friday 11